Cost-of-Stock Basis For Assets Received From Acquired Corporation by Lewis, Mason C.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 19 Number 2 Article 1 
11-1-1964 
Cost-of-Stock Basis For Assets Received From Acquired 
Corporation 
Mason C. Lewis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Mason C. Lewis, Cost-of-Stock Basis For Assets Received From Acquired Corporation, 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 
159 (1964) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol19/iss2/1 
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




VOLUME 19 WINTER, 1964 NUMBER 2
COST-OF-STOCK BASIS FOR ASSETS RECEIVED
FROM ACQUIRED CORPORATION
MASON C. LEWIS*
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 160
A. Purchase-of-Assets Result-Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine ................. 160
B. Purchase-of-Stock Result ............................................ 161
II. E Fr OF TRANSACTION ON PARTIES ....................................... 161
A . Seller .............................................................. 162
1. DOUBLE TAXATION ................................................ 162
2. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS ................................... 162
B. Buyer- Basis of Assets .............................................. 162
III. INTENT TO ACQUIRE ASSETS .............................................. 163
A. Unsuccessful Negotiations to Purchase Assets Directly .................. 164
B. Prompt Liquidation of the Acquired Corporation ...................... 165
C. Integration of the Assets Received into the Purchaser's Business ........ 166
D. Cessation of Operations of the Acquired Corporation .................. 167
E. Stripping-Down of the Corporation Prior to the Sale of its Stock ........ 168
F. Lack of Substantial Relationship Between the Parties to the Transaction ... 169
IV. NATURE OF PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION .................................. 170
A. Individual Purchaser ................................................ 170
B. Corporate Purchaser ................................................ 170
V. 1954 CODIICATION Op Kimbell-Diamond DOCTRINE-SECTION 334(b) (2) ...... 171
A. Requirements for Qualification ..................................... 172
B. Acquisition of Stock and Liquidation ................................ 173
1. "SERIES OF PURCHASES" .......................................... 173
2. SINGLE TRANSACTION .............................................. 173
C . Basis of A ssets ...................................................... 174
D. Anomalous Results Under Section 334(b)(2) .......................... 175
1. BASIS OF CASH .................................................... 175
2. OPTION TO PURCHASE STOCK ....................................... 176
3. INSTALLMENT RECEIVABLES ........................................ 176
E. Failure to Comply with Provisions .................................... 177
1. WILL1UL NON-COMPLIANCE ........................................ 177
2. INADVERTENT NON-COMPLIANCE .................................... 178
VI. GAIN OR LOSs ON RECEIPT OF ASSETS ...................................... 179
VII. SELLER'S POINT OF VIEW ................................................ 180
A. Natural Corollary of Purchase of Assets-Sale of Assets ................ 181
B. Income Earned Prior to Liquidation .................................. 182
* Member of the Florida Bar; LL.B., University of Miami; formerly Editor-in-Chief,
University of Miami Law Review; Teaching Fellow in Law, New York University, 1964-
1965.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
C. Direct Sales Under Section 337 ........................................ 184
1. ADVANTAGES TO PURCHASER ........................................ 184
2. ADOPTION OF THE PLAN OF LIQUIDATION ............................ 184
3. LIMITED RECOGNITION OF GAIN .................................... 185
V III. CONCLUSION ............................................................ 185
In determining the incidence of taxation, we must look through
form and search out the substance of a transaction. . . . This
basic concept of tax law is particularly pertinent to cases in-
volving a series of transactions designed and executed as parts
of a unitary plan to achieve an intended result. Such plans will
be viewed as a whole regardless of whether the effect of so doing
is imposition of or relief from taxation. The series of closely re-
lated steps in such a plan are merely the means by which to
carry out the plan and will not be separated.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purchase-of-Asset Result-Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine
The quoted passage is but one of the many declarations which ac-
knowledge the prominence in our tax laws of a basic concept known as
the step-transaction doctrine. A particular facet of this many-sided doc-
trine comes into play when there has been a purchase of the stock of a
corporation which is to be liquidated for the sole purpose of obtaining
its assets. If this sole purpose is found to have existed at the time the
stock was purchased, the step-transaction doctrine will be applied and
the exchange will be considered as a purchase of assets in which delivery
was made at liquidation. Under this particular application of the step-
transaction principle-specifically referred to as the Kimbell-Diamond
doctrine 2-- the assets will have a basis in the new shareholder's hands
as if they were purchased directly by the shareholder. Consequently,
the assets will be carried at cost (of the stock), rather than at a carry-
over basis or their fair market value at distribution. Therefore, if the
assets received are reincorporated by a transfer of the assets into a new
or existing corporation, there will be no reorganization result since the
conclusion that the assets, rather than the stock, were purchased assumes
the absence of a former ownership of the stock, a requisite under re-
1. Rives, J., in Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th
Cir. 1954).
2. This doctrine derives its name from the case of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co.,
14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827
(1951). In the Kimnbell-Diamond case the doctrine apparently was substantially entrenched
by virtue of the positive and successful assertion of this aspect of the step-transaction doc-
trine by the Commissioner, rather than the taxpayer. See also Helvering v. Security Say. &
Commercial Bank, 72 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1934); Illinois Water Serv. Co., 2 T.C. 1200
(1943). Cases in which the purchase-of-assets-through-stock question was clearly in issue
prior to Kimbell-Diamond are: Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938) ; Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309
(10th Cir. 1933); Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946); Warner Co., 26 B.T.A..1225
(1932).
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organization principles. Furthermore, the basis of the assets to the new
corporation into which the assets are transferred will, in most cases, be
the same as the basis in the hands of the reincorporating shareholder,
whether it is an individual or a corporation.'
B. Purchase-of-Stock Result
On the other hand, assume that the step-transaction doctrine does
not apply and the purchase is found to have been of stock rather than
of assets. Under this conclusion, if an individual acquired the assets upon
liquidation, their fair market value at distribution will be considered the
basis, and gain or loss will be recognized unless the assets are reincorpo-
rated and a reorganization is found to have resulted. If a corporation is
the shareholder-distributee, the assets generally will be taken at their
carryover basis either under the reorganization provisions4 (even without
a new corporation's receiving the assets in a reincorporation), or under
the parent-subsidiary liquidation sections.5 In the latter case, if the dis-
tributee was not a "parent" of the liquidating corporation-that is, it
did not own eighty per cent or more of the liquidating corporation's stock
-the basis would be the fair market value of the assets and gain or
loss would be recognized.6
II. EFFECT OF TRANSACTION ON PARTIES
It can be seen that the two steps of purchasing the stock of a corpo-
ration and its subsequent liquidation are prime targets for the imposition
of the step-transaction doctrine. If the purchaser is a corporation, it will
seek to avoid the carryover basis generally required for the assets re-
ceived upon liquidation of the purchased firm. If the purchaser is an in-
dividual, the fair market value of the assets at liquidation, in most cases,
will be the same as his cost of stock. The resulting basis of the assets,
therefore, would be the same whether the step-transaction doctrine was
applied or not,7 unless the individual reincorporated the assets, in which
case, the crucial issue becomes whether assets or stock were purchased.
The precarious nature of the acquisition could, of course, be alleviated
by the simple device of a direct purchase of the assets. This route, how-
ever, might not be the most desirable for one or both parties to the
transaction.
3. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351 & 358.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 332 & 334.
6. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331.
7. See Betty C. Stockvis, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68 (1951), in which the taxpayer
acquired the stock of the liquidating firm for the sole purpose of utilizing the assets to be
received in a sole proprietorship. Since the liquidation followed the purchase of the stock
by only one month, the fair market value of the assets at liquidation was the same as
the price paid for the stock. Therefore, no gain or loss was realized. Neither the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine nor any aspect of the step-transaction was relied upon in the court's
1964]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A. Seller
1. DOUBLE TAXATION
From the shareholder-seller's point of view, perhaps the most pro-
nounced advantage of executing a sale of stock, rather than having the
corporation transact the sale of its assets directly, is the avoidance of a
double tax. If the adjusted basis of the assets is less than their fair market
value, which is usually the case in view of the liberalized depreciation
allowances, a gain would be recognized to the corporation upon the sale.
When the proceeds of the sale are then distributed in liquidation, the
shareholders would recognize gain to the extent that the amount received
exceeds the basis of their stock. On the other hand, if the shareholders
sold their stock directly to the would-be purchaser of the assets, only one
gain is realized. Because of his decidedly advantageous position, the
seller may refuse to consider a direct sale of the assets, leaving the buyer
no alternative but to purchase the stock in order to acquire the desired
property." Of course, section 337 might alleviate some of the drawbacks
of a direct sale by the corporation.' However, at the corporate level, gain
would still be recognized with respect to any section 1245 and section
1250 assets sold after December 31, 1962.10
2. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
Other incidental reasons which would dictate a sale of stock might
include the recognition that a conveyance of assets generally entails
more time-consuming procedures." Another possibility might be that
the certificate of incorporation calls for unanimous approval of the share-
holders in order to effectuate a sale of its assets, whereas an affirmation
of only eighty per cent is required for a liquidation.
B. Buyer-Basis of Assets
As far as the buyer is concerned, generally he will be concerned
primarily with acquiring the highest basis possible for the assets received.
decision. It should be noted, however, that if the fair market value of the assets at distribu-
tion varied from what it was on the date the stock was purchased, then the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine would not be concerned with this variance, whereas § 331 (a) (1) of
the 1954 Code would require recognition of any gain or loss.
8. The seller might be persuaded to sell assets rather than stock if the sale price were
boosted. The purchaser might be willing to pay the extra price if the parties agree to allo-
cate as much of the purchase price as reasonably possible to the depreciable assets. For
a further discussion of the various practical considerations that arise under an acquisition
of a corporation, see Friedman & Silbert, Acquisition of Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 15TH
INST. ON FED. TAX 659 (1957).
9. See text of section VII(C), infra.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245 & 1250. Both provisions require recognition of
gain to the extent of depreciation recapture notwithstanding any other section of the Code
dealing with income taxes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245(d) & 1250(h).
11. For a discussion of the various problems involved in the purchase and sale of a
corporate enterprise, see Levin, Purchase and Sale of Corporate Businesses: Tax Oppor-
tunities and Pitfalls, 35 TAXES 942 (1957).
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As mentioned previously, if the purchaser is an individual the resulting
basis normally would be the same whether the transaction is considered
as a purchase of assets or one of stock, unless there was a reincorporation
and a reorganization result. A corporate purchaser, however, generally
will be more concerned with acquiring a cost-of-stock basis for the assets.
Of course, if the fair market value of the assets is lower than the adjusted
basis in the hands of the selling corporation, a carryover basis would be
more desirable. In addition, if a relatively minor variance existed between
the two values, a purchase of stock would afford many carryover tax
attributes under section 38112 not available if assets were purchased, and
might easily justify the choice.
One reason that the purchaser would balk at purchasing stock of a
corporation, when only the assets are desired, is the possibility that un-
disclosed or contingent liabilities might arise against the firm after the
transaction. It would seem that the buyer more readily would consent
to the stock transfer if the seller agreed either to make suitable allow-
ances in the price of the stock, or promised to satisfy any obligations
which were incurred prior to the sale of the stock. 3 Of course, if the
buyer assumes any liabilities of the purchased corporation and the trans-
action is found to be a purchase of assets, their basis in the purchaser's
hands is accordingly increased. 14
III. INTENT TO ACQUIRE ASSETS
The prerequisite factor to be determined before the step-transaction
doctrine is applied to the purchase-of-assets-through-stock situation is
the intent of the purchaser to acquire assets at the time the stock is
purchased. If the intent to acquire the assets is formed subsequently,
the step-transaction doctrine will not apply. 5 However, it should be
noted that "interdependence" is not a factor in that the absence of an
obligation on the purchaser's part to liquidate will not necessarily require
a purchase-of-stock result.' Conversely, if it can be shown that the
intent at the time of the purchase was to obtain the stock in order to
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 381.
13. The reported decisions sometimes note that although the seller refused to execute
a direct sale of assets, there was an express agreement to the effect that any undisclosed
or contingent liabilities that related to the period prior to the transfer would be satisfied
by the seller. See, e.g., Estate of Suter, 29 T.C. 244 (1957) ; Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209
(1946).
14. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 25 T.C. 408 (1955); Texas Bank & Trust Co., 22 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 544 (1953).
15. This posture is usually noted in the typical liquidation situation in which the
intent to acquire the assets to be distributed is formed at some time subsequent to the
acquisition of the stock of the liquidating corporation. See, e.g., Distributors Fin. Corp., 20
T.C. 768 (1953).
16. "The fact that the purchaser was perfectly free to hold the stock, with no obligation
to liquidate the corporation, is given no weight unless the idea of liquidating first occurred
to the purchaser after he acquired the stock." Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in
Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx 247, 281-82 (1954).
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acquire control of the corporation and its business, a purchase-of-assets
conclusion might not result. 7
It appears that the number of corporations whose assets are pur-
chased through an acquisition of their stock is not a significant factor
as long as it is shown that the purchaser intended to acquire the assets
of all the corporations. 8
Although certainly not conclusive, the minutes of the purchaser-
corporation's board of directors meetings have been considered as a likely
repository for the manifestation of the presence or absence of the req-
uisite intent.' 9 Documents such as the contract between the purchaser
and the seller of the stock20 and the formal plan of liquidation"' also have
supplied information from which the necessary intent could be gleaned.
Typically, the information sought will relate to the following factors:
(1) unsuccessful negotiations to purchase assets directly; (2) prompt
liquidation of the acquired corporation; (3) integration of the assets
received into the purchaser's business; (4) cessation of operations of
the acquired corporation; (5) stripping-down of the corporation prior
to the sale of its stock; and, (6) lack of substantial relationship between
the parties to the transaction. These factors will be considered separately.
A. Unsuccessful Negotiations to Purchase Assets Directly
The corporation's refusal to sell its assets directly, thereby making
it impossible for the purchaser to acquire the desired property other than
by purchasing the stock, is a circumstance frequently present in cases
where the Kimbell-Diamond rule is asserted.2  In Long Island Water
17. See John Simmons Co., 25 T.C. 635 (1955). In noting the apparently predominant
motive for the purchase as being for the acquisition of control, the court distinguished the
case from Kimbell-Diamond and cases of similar decisional basis:
In each of those cases it appeared that an existing corporation had as its primary
purpose or indeed its sole purpose, the purchase of a particular asset or a group
of assets of another corporation, but was forced by circumstances beyond its con-
trol to effect the *acquisition through the channels of first acquiring the stock and
then liquidating the subsidiary. In those cases the acquiring corporation had no
purpose of continuing the business of the old corporation in a new corporate form.
[In this case] . . . the purpose and the negotiations were to acquire stock and
thereby acquire control of the company and its business. Id. at 641-42.
But see the discussion of those cases in which a going business was the subject matter
of the purchase and a cost-of-stock basis for the assets was sustained, in text of section
III (D), infra.
18. United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1960) (four); Kanawha Gas
& Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954) (eight); Koppers Coal Co.,
6 T.C. 1209 (1946) (six).
19. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951) ; Trianon Hotel Co., 30 T.C. 156 (1958);
Conte Equip. Corp., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 736 (1958).
20. Illinois Water Serv. Co., 2 T.C. 1200 (1943).
21. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., supra note 19.
22. Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306
U.S. 661 (1938); Georgia Properties Co. v. Henslee, 138 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Tenn. 1955);
Long Island Water Corp., 36 T.C. 377 (1961); Estate of Suter, 29 T.C. 244 (1957) ; George
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Corp.,2" the impossibility of obtaining the assets directly was examined
as to whether it was a prerequisite for the application of the step-trans-
action doctrine in this area or whether it was merely a factor to be con-
sidered along with the other circumstances. However, the precise point
was not decided, since the court found that even if it were considered
only a factor, a purchase of assets result would not have obtained. In
addition to the fact that there was no evidence of any unsuccessful
negotiations for a direct purchase, other circumstances pointed to the
lack of an intent to acquire the assets at the time the stock was
purchased.
Although the fact that the seller refused to allow a direct purchase
of the assets would lend much support to the purchaser's contention that
assets were acquired, the absence of this fact need not be fatal to his
position. The step-transaction doctrine is bottomed on the familiar con-
cept that substance should be regarded over form, which would not re-
quire any particular reason for the purchaser's having entertained the
intent to purchase assets through the acquisition of stock.
B. Prompt Liquidation of the Acquired Corporation
If the purchase was truly one of assets, it is natural to assume that
the purchaser would wish to acquire the assets as soon as possible in
order to utilize them as he had intended. This assumption often prompts
the courts to consider the time span between the purchase of the stock
and the liquidation of the corporation as an indication of whether the
requisite intent did exist. 4 There seems to have been a good deal of
leniency on this point, however.2 5 In one case, the final liquidating dis-
Haiss Mfg. Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 938 (1957); Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 25 T.C.
408 (1955); S. Nicholas Jacobs, 21 T.C. 165 (1953), aff'd, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955);
Texas Bank & Trust Co., 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 544 (1953). Cf. Tube Bar,' Inc., 15 T.C.
922 (1950).
It is interesting to note, however, that in the Kimbell-Diamond case, supra note 17,
there was no explicit indication that this factor was present, although there were statements
made in the corporate minutes from which previous unsuccessful negotiations to purchase
assets directly could be inferred. The court's decision, rather, was based primarily on the
plan enumerated in the taxpayer's minutes to purchase the stock for the sole purpose of
liquidating the firm (which was accomplished three days after the purchase) in order to
replace the assets the taxpayer had lost in a fire. It was noted also that because of building
restrictions enacted subsequent to the firm's establishment, new facilities could not be
constructed on the old site.
23. 36 T.C. 377 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954)
(sixth months); H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953) (six months); Ruth M. Cullen, 14
T.C. 368 (1950) (same day).
25. Individual purchasers might be prompted to take advantage of this leniency by
delaying the liquidation as much as possible. As one writer pointed out, this tactic would
be advantageous to the high bracket taxpayer who would prefer to allow his corporation
to incur the tax liability on the income earned by the assets to be acquired. Merritt, Real
Estate: Methods of. Acquisition-Assets or Stock?, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. oN FED. TAx 235,
254 (1956).
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tribution was not made until six months after the purchase of the stock,
during which time the business was carried on as usual; the court noted
that "the length of time consumed is not fatal to a determination that
the corporation was in process of complete liquidation," and held that
the basis of the assets would be the cost of the stock.26 In another situa-
tion, the expiration of a full year before the assets were distributed in
liquidation did not preclude the application of the step-transaction
doctrine.
2 7
C. Integration of the Assets Received Into the Purchaser's Business
A third factor considered by the courts in determining the presence
of the purchaser's intent to acquire assets is whether the property dis-
tributed in liquidation was integrated into the taxpayer's existing busi-
ness.2 ' This factor of integration, however, certainly is no more deter-
minative than any other factor which might manifest the requisite in-
tent.29 Under the light of this proposition, purchases of stock by
26. H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850, 860 (1953).
27. Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 661 (1938). An important consideration entertained by the court in its view of
the one-year period between purchase of the stock and liquidation was the fact that there
was an escrow agreement involved which required the delay until the entire purchase price
was paid. In Trianon Hotel Co., 30 T.C. 156 (1958) however, where there was no restrictive
escrow agreement or the like and circumstances pointed to a primary motive for acquiring
the purchased stock based on reasons other than obtaining assets, the time span of one
year added support to the court's decision against the taxpayer.
An interesting situation was recently considered by the Ninth Circuit in which the
operating assets of the acquired corporation were distributed in the year the distributee
acquired full ownership, the liquid assets being distributed in the following year. Because
the operating assets were resold by the taxpayer immediately upon receipt, the question
arose as to their proper basis in order to correctly compute the gain. The taxpayer asserted
that he realized gain upon the liquidation of approximately $30,000, the difference between
the fair market value of the operating assets (also the resale price he received) and the
adjusted basis of all of his stock in the liquidating corporation. In the following year,
approximately $101,000 (the remaining liquid assets of the firm) was distributed. This
amount was treated as a long term capital gain. The government sought to assert the
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine to construe the acquisition of the stock of the liquidating
corporation as a purchase of assets, substantially all of which occurred in the same month
as the resale. This approach would have resulted in the price paid for the stock being allo-
cated among all the assets of the corporation in 1952, including the $101,000 in liquid assets.
Consequently, the operating assets would have been held at a basis of $101,000 less than
the total cost of the taxpayer's stock, which finally, would have resulted in a corresponding
increase of the short term capital gain in 1952 (attributed to the resale rather than to
the liquidation). In holding for the government, the court noted that "this appears to be
the first case ... in which application of the [Kimbell-Diamond] rule and the accompanying
cost allocation urged by the Government would operate to place the capital gain in an
earlier accounting period than would otherwise be the case." United States v. Mattison,
273 F.2d 13, 20 (9th Cir. 1959).
28. See, e.g., Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., supra note 19 (replacement of assets
destroyed by fire) and Warner, Co., 26 B.TA. 1225 (1932) (supply of sand and gravel)
where the assets acquired were necessary for the continued operations of the purchaser firms.
29. See United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13, 19 (9th Cir. 1959); North Am. Serv.
Co., 33 T.C. 677, 691 (1960); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 718, 732 (1962). In the North Am.
Serv. Co. case, the court noted:
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non-operating holding companies have been examined with varying re-
sults.8" There have been cases in which this factor was manifestly absent,
and yet the application of the Kimbell-Diamond rule was considered
appropriate. Two court of appeal decisions illustrate this situation."
Both cases involved a purchaser who intended to resell the assets upon
receipt. The Tax Court reached a similar result in a case in which the
taxpayer intended to make a gift of the assets acquired at some future
date.82
D. Cessation of Operations of the Acquired Corporation
Another factor which has furnished substance to the proposition that
the acquisition of stock was, in effect, a purchase of assets, is the cessa-
tion of the activities of the purchased corporation prior to the transfer
of stock. Put another way, the question is whether the purchase of a
going business and its continuation in a new corporate form will preclude
the application of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. Logically, it would
seem that if the entire business was the subject matter of the purchase,
the clear intent was to purchase the means of its ownership-the stock.
This conclusion has been favored when the purchased business con-
tinued to be operated in substantially the same manner after the pur-
chase as before.83 The more recent cases, however, expressly discount
this factor as determinative and allow a purchase-of-assets result even
when it was clear that the business of the purchased corporation was,
in fact, continued without interruption."
In determining whether, in substance, the objective of the transaction was the
acquisition of property, it is necessary to consider all the relevant evidence, of which
the failure to integrate the purchased assets into the business of the acquiring tax-
payer may well be an important element. However, to make such failure conclusive
of the determination, as contended by respondent, would introduce a new artifi-
ciality of form and create a rigidity of application inconsistent with the under-
lying purpose of the rule." Id. at 691.
30. See United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1960) (cost-of-stock
basis); American Steel & Pump Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 133 (1962) (cost-of-stock
basis); Illinois Water Serv. Co., 2 T.C. 1200 (1943) (carryover basis).
In George Haiss Mfg. Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 938 (1957), an integration of assets
caused by a statutory merger rather than a liquidation was not preclusive of the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine.
31. United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959), and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States, 264 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1959).
32. H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953).
33. Trianon Hotel Co., 30 T.C. 156 (1958); Garden State Developers, Inc., 30 T.C.
135 (1958); John Simmons Co., 25 T.C. 635 (1955). In Garden State Developers, Inc.,
the court refused to allow a cost-of-stock basis, notwithstanding that the taxpayer was ab-
solutely precluded from liquidating the purchased firm under the terms of his contract.
But see Helvering v. Security Sav. & Commercial Bank, 72 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1934).
34. United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1960); American Steel &
Pump Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 133 (1962); North Am. Serv. Co., Inc., 33 T.C. 677
(1960); Henning Corp., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 519 (1960).
In United States v. M.O.J. Corp., after the shares of stock of four corporations were
purchased, the corporate structures were dissolved into the firm that was organized for
the purpose of continuing the businesses, which was done without interruption. The court
explained its position by stating:
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Following a consistent approach, the courts have held that the
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine will apply even though the intangible as well
as the tangible assets are the alleged subject matter of the purchase. 5
A statutory merger of a going business into the taxpayer, however, was
found to be an inappropriate transaction for the application of the Kim-
bell-Diamond doctrine, but primarily on the ground that it was not shown
that there were unsuccessful negotiations for the direct purchase of the
assets. 6 In Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co.,8 7 one of the lead-
ing cases in this area of the step-transaction doctrine, the fact that the
purchased corporation and the parent filed consolidated tax returns did
not preclude a finding that the basis of the assets upon liquidation one
year after the purchase would be the cost of the stock. An important
factor in that case, however, was that the purchaser was not free to
liquidate the acquired corporation until it did so, because of the re-
strictive escrow agreement involved.3 8
E. Stripping-Down of the Corporation Prior to the Sale of its Stock
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the situation in which a
going business is acquired, the courts have recognized the significance of
the stripping-down of a corporation prior to the sale of its stock. If the
purchaser is interested in acquiring particular assets, there would seem
to be no reason why he would pay for all the properties of the corpo-
ration to be purchased. In most instances, therefore, when it is shown
that all but the desired assets had been distributed to the former share-
holders prior to the sale, the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is applied with
relatively little reluctance. 9 Of course, it has been carefully noted that
The essential thing is that here is a corporation that wishes to acquire the assets
of another corporation; it does not want the intervening corporate structure; it
never intends to keep it in existence for any of the many reasons that one corpo-
ration may desire to operate a wholly owned subsidiary as a separate entity;
it therefore never intends for it to be a real subsidiary and it never is, in fact,
except just long enough to be dissolved. Assuming the correctness of the decision
of all the courts that when this situation exists as a part of a plan to buy specific
property the purchase of the stock and liquidation of the corporation owning
the property is disregarded we perceive no difference conceptually when it
exists as a part of a plan to buy a going business." Id. at 717. (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the Internal Revenue Service has expressly indicated that
it would follow the M.O.J. Corp. case. Rev. Rul. 246, 1960-2 Cum . BULL. 462. The
Service has also indicated that the purchase of a going business would not preclude the
application of § 334(b)(2) of the 1954 Code. Rev. Rul. 262, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 114. See
text in section V infra.
35. United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959); American Steel & Pump
Corp., 31 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 133 (1962) (names of acquired corporations retained in
order to utilize good will).
36. Long Island Water Corp., 36 T.C. 377 (1961).
37. 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938).
38. See supra note 27.
39. See Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954);
Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., supra note 35; Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter,
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"[T]he failure to 'strip-down,' although an important circumstance in
determining whether the intent and purpose were to purchase assets
or to purchase stock, cannot be regarded as prohibiting a finding that the
intent and purpose were to purchase assets, especially when other cir-
cumstances indicate otherwise."4
F. Lack of Substantial Relationship Between the Parties to
the Transaction
Somewhat related to the acquisition of a going business is the re-
lationship between the purchaser and the corporation, the assets of which
allegedly are the subject of the transaction. Typically, when there is
truly a purchase-of-assets-through-stock situation, the shareholders of
the corporation with the assets are entirely unrelated to the purchaser
of the stock.4 If the purchaser is a corporation and its shareholders are
also the shareholders of the "selling" corporation, the intent to acquire
assets might be found to be missing. Although this circumstance is not
necessarily treated independently, it affords greater weight to the prop-
osition that the basic purpose of the exchange was oriented more toward
inter-corporate political considerations rather than with an eye toward
the acquisition of any particular assets.
The fact pattern under scrutiny in this section generally entails the
purchase of stock of a corporation, and its subsequent liquidation or
use of other means by which the assets are acquired by the purchaser of
the stock. The above examination of the factors which have been con-
sidered relevant to the existence of the intent to acquire assets at the
time the stock of the "selling" corporation is purchased should indicate
clearly that the presence or absence of any one factor is not determina-
tive. All the circumstances will be considered, with the primary object
of searching out the true substance of the transaction.
66 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1933) ; George Haiss Mfg. Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 938 (1957);
Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946) ; Carter Publications, Inc., 28 B.T.A. 160 (1933).
40. Estate of Suter, 29 T.C. 244, 259 (1957). See also Orr Mills, 30 T.C. 150 (1958).
41. In the pronouncement indicating that it would follow the case of United States
v. M.O.J. Corp., supra note 34, the Internal Revenue Service made express mention of
its reliance upon the fact that there was no substantial relationship between the parties
to the transaction: "The acquisition of assets through the purchase-liquidation method
in the instant case was by a corporation owned by an entirely different group of stock-
holders from the group which owned the acquired corporations." Rev. Rul. 246, 1960-2
CUMr. BULL. 462.
42. See North Am. Serv. Co., 33 T.C. 677 (1960); John Simmons Co., 25 T.C. 635
(1955). See also Illinois Water Serv. Co., 2 T.C. 1200 (1943). A substantial similarity
betwen the parties' directors and officers, as well as shareholders, afforded the foundation
for a similar carryover basis conclusion in Trianon Hotel Co., 30 T.C. 156 (1958). At
least one source has considered this factor of a lack of substantial relationship between
the parties to the transaction as prerequisite rather than merely persuasive. See 3 CCH
1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 2434.01.
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IV. NATURE OF PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION
A. Individual Purchaser
In addition to examining carefully the various factors which may
lead to a cost-of-stock basis conclusion, the courts have inquired into
the nature of the purchaser. Although generally the rule expressly relied
upon by the courts is known as the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, and the
case to which this doctrine owes its appellation involved a corporate pur-
chaser, the rationale of the decision contemplates individuals as well. 8
The rule has been applied expressly to situations in which individuals
purchased the stock with a view to reselling the assets upon receipt,'4
to making a gift of the acquired property to members of the purchaser's
family,45 or to transferring the assets to a newly formed corporation.4 6
B. Corporate Purchaser
Corporate purchasers also have made use of the newly formed sub-
sidiary corporation established for the sole purpose of receiving the
assets from the liquidated corporation. The new firm might acquire the
stock itself47 or have the assets transferred to it by the parent.4 8 In the
latter situation, when the recipient corporation had not been formed at
the time the purchaser acquired the stock, the requisite intent has been
ascribed to it.49 It would appear that in those situations when the indi-
vidual or corporation which acquired the stock "controlled" the recipient
corporation, a statutory avenue of approach could be taken without the
necessity of ascribing the requisite intent. Assuming that it already had
43. See Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950), decided only two months after the
Kimbell-Diamond decision, in which the court held that an individual taxpayer was en-
titled to carry the assets acquired for its sole proprietorship at the cost of the stock
purchased for the purpose of obtaining the liquidated corporation's property. See also
Betty C. Stockvis, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68 (1951), which also involved an individual
and a sole proprietorship. In this case, however, the court reached the same result with-
out applying the Kimbell-Diamond rule. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
One writer has noted that in light of the statutory incorporation of the Kimbell-
Diamond principles, explicitly with regard to corporations, in § 334(b)(2) of the 1954
Code, "it seems unlikely that application of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine will be denied
in the case of individual purchasers since the doctrine is only a variation of the
fundamental rule that substance prevails over form, and since Congress has not
specified any special rules for individuals." Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diamond Situation:
Basis to the Purchaser in Connection with Liquidation, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
623, 634 (1955).
44. United States v. Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959). See discussion of this
case, supra note 27.
45. H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953).
46. Georgia Properties Co. v. Henslee, 138 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Tenn. 1955); Estate
of Suter, 29 T.C. 244 (1957). In both of the above cases the new corporations were
formed after the stock had been purchased by the individuals. In Carter Publications,
Inc., 28 B.T.A. 160 (1933), an individual purchaser was considered as the agent of the
already existing corporation for which he executed the transaction.
47. See Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946).
48. See American Steel & Pump Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 133 (1962).
49. Orr Mills, 30 T.C. 150 (1958).
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been established that the purchaser was entitled to the cost-of-stock basis
for the assets, section 362(a) would require the basis to be the same for
the recipient corporation as it was in the hands of the transferor.5 °
V. 1954 CODIFICATION OF Kimbell-Diamond DOCTRINE-SECTION
334(B) (2)
Another statutory avenue of approach is open to the corporate pur-
chaser through the 1954 codification of the Kimbell-Diamond rule.5 This
provision, which was drafted exclusively for corporate purchasers, 52 has
been construed as not requiring the intent-to-acquire-assets element that
had been considered earlier.55
Prior to 1954, a parent was permitted to liquidate its subsidiary tax-
free under the predecessor of section 332 and the basis of the assets re-
ceived in liquidation was prescribed by the predecessor of section 334,
which caused the subsidiary's basis to be carried over to the parent. If,
however, the parent was able to show that the stock of its subsidiary was
purchased for the sole reason of acquiring its assets, a cost-of-stock basis
for the assets might have resulted. The 1954 Code has introduced an
exception to the carryover basis effect of section 334 which, as mentioned
earlier, is not concerned with the intent of the purchaser. This exception
is found in the provisions of section 334(b) (2)."'
Congress, concerned with the established and oft-quoted concept
that the "substance of a transaction will prevail over its form," attempted
through section 334(b) (2) to attain some degree of certainty in an area
formerly plagued with the tenuous standard of subjective intent-at
least so far as corporate purchasers might be concerned.
Whether the provisions of section 334(b) (2) operate to the qualify-
50. If property was acquired on or after June 22, 1954, by a corporation . . . in
connection with a transaction to which section 351 (relating to transfer of property
to corporation controlled by transferor) applies . . . then the basis shall be the
same as it would be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of
gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 362 (a).
51. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b) (2). For two very fine discussions of the
operation of this section, see Merritt, Real Estate: Methods of Acquisition-Assets or
Stock?, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 235 (1956), and Schwartz, Acquisition of Stock
of Another Corporation in Order to Acquire Assets, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAX INST. 45.
52. "If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in complete liquidation
of another corporation . . . ." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 334(b)(2). (Emphasis added.)
See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1954).
53. See text in section III supra.
54. The language used in the Code, "the basis of the property in the hands of the
distributee shall be the adjusted basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution
was made," would seem to indicate that the intent element is immaterial. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 334(b)(2). (Emphasis added.) The Service has also taken this position in
referring to the effect of strict compliance with the Code provisions: "In this connection,
the formal steps themselves are significant under the 1954 Code and the element of
purpose or intent is immaterial." Rev. Rul. 262, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 114, 115.
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ing corporation's advantage or disadvantage depends upon the relation-
ship between the cost paid for the stock by the parent and the basis of
the assets in the subsidiary's hands. A lower-than-cost-basis situation will
result in a benefit to the parent to the extent of the step-up in basis per-
mitted in the acquired property. The converse, a higher-than-cost-basis
situation, will deprive the parent of a portion of the subsidiary's basis
that it would have been entitled to depreciate, etc., under the pre-1954
Code provisions. As is noted below, although the provisions appear to
operate automatically, the parent effectively can elect to qualify by a
proper timing of the acquisition of the subsidiary's stock, the adoption of
the plan of liquidation, or the period over which the distributions are
made. Therefore, in most cases it is reasonable to assume that section
334(b) (2), when applicable, will operate to the parent's advantage.
Whatever the economic implications might be, the Code will allow a
parent to operate an acquired subsidiary for a period of years on a trial
basis. If the firm is successful, liquidation need not be considered. If,
however, it appears that the firm's assets could be put to better use else-
where, the parent still will be able to enjoy the cost-of-stock basis for
the property to be relocated.
A. Requirements for Qualification
To qualify under this exception, the corporation must have pur-
chased 5 eighty per cent or more of the subsidiary's stock during a period
of not more than twelve months."6 This section also provides that the
plan of liquidation must have been adopted not more than two years
after the requisite eighty per cent was purchased.57 In addition, because
the provisions of section 332 (b) also must be complied with,5" the parent
must own the eighty per cent at the date of the adoption of the plan and
continuously until the property is received.59 Finally, the transfer of the
property in liquidation must occur either within one taxable year or
within three years from the end of the year in which the first distribution
is made. 60
55. "Purchase" is defined by § 334(b)(3) as being any acquisition of stock other
than one in which a substituted basis prevails or in which the basis is determined under
§ 1014(a). Also not qualifying are those acquisitions to which § 351 would apply or
where § 318(a) would operate to construe the one who is to acquire the stock as the
owner.
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b)(2)(B).
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b)(2)(A)(ii).
58. "For purposes of this subsection, the term 'distributee' means only the corpo-
ration which meets the 80 percent stock ownership requirements specified in section
332 (b)." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b)(4).
59. But § 332 will apply only if "the corporation receiving such property was, on
the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation, and has continued to be at all
times until the receipt of the property, the owner of stock .... " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 332(b) (1).
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 332(b)(2) and (3).
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B. Acquisition of Stock and Liquidation
1. "SERIES OF PURCHASES"
As stated above, the provisions of section 334(b) (2) allow the parent
two years from the time that eighty per cent of the subsidiary's stock is
purchased to adopt the plan of liquidation. When the eighty per cent
or more is purchased in one block and in one transaction, there are no
complications in computing this statutory holding period. However, it
would not be unusual for the requisite percentage of ownership to be
acquired in a "series of purchases."'" In this type of acquisition, it is
possible to have the two-year period run from a date other than that on
which the eighty per cent was acquired. This result will obtain when the
last purchase (representing anything from eighty-one per cent to 100
per cent) is made within a twelve-month period in which some eighty per
cent block is acquired." However, if instead of a "series of purchases"
situation, the requisite eighty per cent was acquired in a "single trans-
action," the two-year period would begin to run from that date.6"
2. SINGLE TRANSACTION
In connection with this "single transaction" concept, it was interest-
ing to find that an appropriate application of the step-transaction doc-
trine might be involved. It is interesting because section 334 (b) (2) is
itself a codification of the specific step-transaction doctrine established
in the Kimbell-Diamond case. This application is seen when a relatively
close-in-time series of purchases results in an eighty per cent ownership.
The series might be considered as a single transaction, 4 the date of which
will be that of the last purchase. Theref ore, even if a subsequent purchase
of twenty per cent or less of stock takes place within a twelve-month
period from the date of the first purchase in the series, because the entire
series could be considered as a single transaction, the two years will
61. "Except as provided in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph, in the case
of a series of purchases of stock, the two-year period specified in section 334(b)
(2)(A) shall begin on the day following the earliest date which is the end of
a period of twelve months or less within which the amount of stock [80%]
required by section 334(b) (2) (B) was acquired." Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(3)
(i) (1958).
62. The regulations provide the following example of this situation:
[A]ssume that 20 percent of the stock of corporation A is purchased on each of
the following dates: April 1, 1956, June 30, 1956, September 30, 1956, December
31, 1956, and June 1, 1957. The two-year period shall begin on January 1, 1957.
However, if the first purchase of 20 percent of the stock occurs on November 1,
1955 (instead of April 1, 1956), then the two-year period shall begin on June
2, 1957. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(3)(i) (1958).
63. The regulations specifically refer to a "series of purchases." See note 61, supra.
64. There may be cases in which a series of acquisitions occur as a result of
a plan which results in the acquisition of 80 percent of such stock and which
was intended to so result within a comparatively short period, for example,
within one year. In a proper case such a series of acquisitions could qualify
as one transaction. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A133 (1955).
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continue to run from the date on which the first eighty per cent was
acquired."
C. Basis of Assets
The primary object of section 334(b) (2) is to allow-or require, as
the case may be-the parent to carry the assets received from its liquida-
ted subsidiary at a basis equal to the cost incurred for the subsidiary's
stock. The regulations provide that the cost of all of the subsidiary's stock
held by the parent shall be considered in this respect, regardless of the
date or manner of acquisition. 6 The regulations are also quite explicit
with regard to the computations that might be required in order to adjust
the cost of the purchased stock to the proper basis for the assets re-
ceived.67 Generally, the purpose of these adjustments is to "maintain the
basis of the assets distributed in complete liquidation as closely as possi-
ble to the basis which they would have were liquidation to proceed
promptly." 8
Very briefly, the regulations first call for the adjusted basis of the
subsidiary's stock to be reduced by the amount of all distributions re-
ceived by the parent from the subsidiary during the period beginning
on the day on which the section 334 stock was purchased (or from the
earliest purchase of such stock in the case of a series of purchases), and
65. An example of this situation would be where eighty per cent of the corpora-
tion's stock is purchased during the period of January 1, 1964 and April 1, 1964. The
remaining twenty per cent is purchased on December 1, 1964. Although the last purchase
is within the same twelve months period in which some eighty per cent is acquired,
if the initial eighty per cent acquisition will be treated as a single transaction, the two-
year period will run from April 2, 1964 rather than from January 1, 1965. For a dis-
cussion of the single transaction problem, see Merritt, Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate
Business, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 693, 723-25 (1955).
66 "The basis of the stock used in determining the basis of the assets is the total
basis of all stock held by the parent corporation whether or not such stock was acquired
by purchase and whether or not such stock is the stock acquired during the [two-year]
period . . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(1) (1958). Compare this computation required
under § 334(b)(2) with a similar situation under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine as
applied to an individual, as in Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950). Cullen was a twenty-
five per cent owner of Cullen Corp., who purchased the remaining seventy-five per cent
from the other owners. The taxpayer paid an amount in excess of the fair market value
of all of the corporation's assets. On the same day that the stock was purchased, the tax-
payer liquidated the corporation and transferred the assets to a sole proprietorship.
Cullen claimed a short term capital loss as represented by the difference between the
fair market value of the corporation's assets distributed in liquidation and the basis
of the stock that was surrendered (the original twenty-five per cent plus the subse-
quently purchased seventy-five per cent). The court held that there was no loss on
liquidation since the petitioner simply had purchased the assets rather than the stock.
The petitioner did realize long term capital gain on the liquidation, however, as if
he were still the owner of only twenty-five per cent of the stock. The gain was based
on the difference between the original cost of the twenty-five per cent of the stock
and the fair market value of a twenty-five per cent interest of the total assets.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c) (4) (i) (1958). For a detailed review of the regulations
dealing with the basis adjustments, see Schwartz, Acquisition of Stock of Another Corpora-
tion in Order to Acquire Assets, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAx INST. 45.
68. Merritt, Real Estate: Methods of Acquisition-Assets or Stock?, N.Y.U. 14TH
INST. ON FED. TAx 235, 255 (1956). See generally id. at 255-59.
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ending on the date when the plan of liquidation was adopted. Second,
further adjustments are required upon receipt of the liquidating distribu-
tions.6 The adjusted basis must be increased by the "unsecured liabilities
assumed by the parent"7 and the "portion of the subsidiary's earnings
and profits (less the amount of any distributions therefrom) of the period
beginning on the date of purchase and ending upon the date of the last
distribution in liquidation attributable to the stock of the subsidiary
held by the parent."'" Finally, the adjusted basis is required to be de-
creased "by the amount of any cash and its equivalent received" 2 and
"by the portion of the subsidiary's deficit in earnings and profits of the
period beginning on the date of purchase and ending upon the date of
the last distribution in liquidation attributable to the stock of the sub-
sidiary held by the parent."78
D. Anomalous Results under Section 334(b)(2)
As with many statutory enactments which endeavor expressly to
provide for the gamut of possibilities under its language, section
334(b)(2) has engendered speculation about some rather anomalous
results which, theoretically, could obtain.
1. BASIS OF CASH
Consider the situation in which the parent causes the subsidiary to
sell all of its assets for an amount equal to their basis in the subsidiary's
hands74 at a time almost two years from the date at which the subsidiary's
69. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.334-1(c)(4)(i)-(iv) (1958).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c) (4) (v) (a) (1) (1958).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1958).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(b)(1) (1958).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c) (4) (v) (b) (2) (1958).
If the purchaser of the corporation's stock is an individual, the above regulations
do not apply. Consequently, instead of there being required adjustments to the basis
of the stock in the event of pre-liquidation corporate earnings or losses (so as to
result in the time-of-purchase basis for the assets when received), the individual's basis of
his stock will remain the same. Because of the absence of a basis of stock adjustment,
the end result is a basis of assets adjustment. This position assumes, of course, that the
period of delay is not so extended so as to preclude the application of the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine. For example, if the firm earned income prior to liquidation, there
would be more liquid assets for distribution than had existed when the stock was pur-
chased. Therefore, the cost of the stock would have to be allocated over more assets,
resulting in a decrease of basis of those assets originally "purchased." On the other
hand, if the firm sustained a loss during this period, there would be fewer liquid assets
over which the cost of stock would be allocated, resulting in a higher basis for each.
If liabilities were incurred by the firm which the purchaser was required to assume,
he would be entitled to step-up his total basis to that extent (as if he had paid more
for the stock). For an interesting discussion of this distinction between corporate and
individual purchasers as to basis adjustment, see Merritt, Real Estate: Methods of Acqui-
sition-Assets or Stock?, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 235, 253-55 (1956).
74. Since no gain or loss would be realized by the subsidiary, no adjustment would
be required under Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c) (4) (v) (a) (2) (1958) or Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1
(c)(4)(v)(b)(2) (1958). See notes 71 and 73, supra.
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stock was purchased. While the subsidiary's only asset is cash, and still
within the two-year period, the parent causes the subsidiary to liquidate.
If the parent paid either more or less for the subsidiary's stock than the
adjusted basis of the assets, which the subsidiary sold at neither gain
nor loss, the literal application of section 334(b)(2) would require the
cash to be taken by the parent at a figure different from the face value.
This anomaly has been recognized and discounted by at least one writer.75
2. OPTION TO PURCHASE STOCK
Another writer has observed what might have been a "ridiculous
result" under a literal application of sections 318(a) and 334(b)(2)
were it not for the fact that a regulation had rendered the literal interpre-
tation academic.76 If a purchaser takes an option to buy the stock of a
totally unrelated person's corporation, and subsequently exercises the
option, section 318(a) would require the optionee to be considered as
the owner of the stock.77 This interpretation would result literally in a
purchase from himself. However, as mentioned, a regulation specifically
provides for this situation and the stock is considered as having been




Another interesting situation has been recognized in connection with
the treatment of installment receivables carried by the subsidiary.79 If
the installment sales qualified under section 453, no income would be
realized until and to the extent that the receivables are collected. Section
75. Perhaps the basis of the purchasing corporation's other assets must be re-
duced or perhaps the Government will claim a taxable gain upon the liquidation,
but no warrant for either of these possibilities can be found in the statute ...
Section 334(b)(2) must yield to more fundamental principles with respect to
the basis of cash. Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diamond Situation: Basis to the Pur-
chaser in Connection with Liquidation, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. O4 FED. TAX 623,
632-33 (1955).
76. See Schwartz, Acquisition of Stock of Another Corporation in Order to Acquire
Assets, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAx INST. 45, 52.
77. "If any person has an option to acquire stock, such stock shall be considered
as owned by such person." INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a)(3).
78. For the purposes of section 334(b)(2) the term 'purchase' means any acquisi-
tion of stock, but only if . . . the stock is not acquired from a person the
ownership of whose stock would, under section 318(a), be attributed to the person
acquiring such stock. However, if a corporation acquires stock pursuant to an
option to buy such stock from a person who, without regard to such option,
is not a person the ownership of whose stock would, under section 318(a),
be attributed to such corporation, such stock shall be considered to have been
purchased on the date of the acquisition of such option, if such option is exer-
cised on or before the last day of a period of 12 months beginning on the day
of the earliest purchase of stock (including the stock subject to such option)
used in determining the applicability of section 334(b)(2) and for this purpose
the stock with respect to which the option was exercised shall be deemed to
have been purchased on the date such option was acquired. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1
(c) (6)(iii) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
79. See Schwartz, supra note 76. at 63.
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453 (d) (4) provides, in effect, that in a section 332 liquidation, no acceler-
ation of the receivable occurs, i.e., there is no gain or loss. Since there
is no exception made for a section 334(b) (2) transaction, it would appear
that the parent could take over the receivables at their fair market value
(approximately the face amount), which would be the price of the stock
paid by the parent, and cause the unrealized installment ordinary income
to escape tax completely. 80
E. Failure to Comply with Provisions
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the primary reason of the
corporation or the individual for purchasing the stock of another corpo-
ration was to acquire its assets. In the case of an individual, this reason
must be established affirmatively as the sole purpose in order for the
assets received to be carried at a cost-of-stock basis. Since 1954, how-
ever, a corporation is no longer required to establish this reason or intent
to obtain the basis desired. Consequently, a corporation may wish to
acquire another corporation for the sole purpose of taking advantage of
the several tax attributes which may be carried over under section 381.
In this state of affairs, section 334(b) (2) exists as a pitfall for the un-
wary corporate purchaser. Since this section applies irrespective of in-
tent,8 ' if the stock of the subsidiary is purchased within a twelve-month
period and the liquidation takes place within two years of the purchase,
a cost-of-stock basis will be the automatic result and section 381 will
not apply.
2
With regard to the tax attributes carryover situation, one writer has
suggested the possibility of a "have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too" opportu-
nity, at least with respect to the operating loss carryover. This may be
obtained, he states, "by continuing the corporation in existence for
slightly less than two years, using up the loss carryover and then liqui-
dating. This defers the use of the stepped-up basis, but does not reduce
the step-up.
'8 3
1. WILLFUL NON-COMPLIANC E
Therefore, it is obvious that if the corporate purchaser desires to
make full use of section 381 and to obtain the assets of the subsidiary
80. The author notes that there is a difference of opinion among the commentators
as to whether this result was intentional. To date, there is no regulation or ruling
which modifies the effect of the strict application of the code as explained in the text.
81. For a consideration of the intent element see notes 53 and 54, supra.
82. "In the case of the acquisition of assets of a corporation by another corpora-
tion .. . in a distribution to such other corporation to which section 332 (relating to
liquidations of subsidiaries) applies, except in a case in which the basis of the assets
distributed is determined under section 334(b)(2) ... T." Irt REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381(a)
(1). (Emphasis added.)
83. Levin, Purchase and Sale of Corporate Businesses: Tax Opportunities and Pit-
falls, 35 TAxEs 942, 944 (1957). Of course, this position assumes that the acquired corpora-
tion carries on substantially the same business as it did previous to the purchase as re-
quired by § 382(a)(1)(C).
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at an amount other than the cost incurred for the stock, it must avoid
section 334(b)(2). First, if the parent desires to "carry over" the sub-
sidiary's higher than fair market value basis, it must qualify the trans-
action under section 332 and either have purchased the stock over a
period of more than twelve months or have delayed the adoption of a
plan of liquidation for more than two years after the stock was acquired.
Second, if the fair market value of the assets is higher than both the cost
of the stock and the subsidiary's basis, sections 334(b)(2) and 332 must
be avoided. This can be accomplished by acquiring less than eighty per
cent of the subsidiary's stock or by reducing the holding to less than
eighty per cent prior to the receipt of any property from the subsidiary.84
These provisions also may be avoided by extending the liquidating dis-
tributions of the property over a period of more than three years.85 Of
course, in order for the fair market value to govern the basis of the assets
received, a gain will be recognized by the parent."(
2. INADVERTENT NON-COMPLIANCE
Notwithstanding section 381 and the other possible reasons con-
sidered that might cause the corporate purchaser to prefer to avoid the
provisions of section 334(b)(2), a question arises as to the position of
a parent which expressly desires to qualify under section 334(b) (2), but
for one reason or another fails to do so. Most writers seem to take the
position that a corporation's exclusive avenue to obtain a cost-of-stock
basis for the assets received in liquidation is section 334(b)(2).17 It has
been recognized, however, that there is the possibility that the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine still has vitality with respect to corporate purchasers
who do not qualify under the provisions of the statute.88
84. [A] distribution shall be considered to be in complete liquidation only if ...
the corporation receiving such property was, on the date of the adoption of the
plan of liquidation, and has continued to be at all times until the receipt to the
property, the owner of stock (in such other corporation) possessing at least
80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
to vote and the owner of at least 80 percent of the total number of shares
of all other classes of stock .... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 332(b)(1).
85. [I]f the transfer of the property is not completed within the three-year
period allowed by section 332 or if the recipient corporation does not continue
qualified with respect to the ownership of stock of the liquidating corporation
as required by that section, gain or loss shall be recognized with respect to each
distribution and the tax liability for each of the years covered in whole or in
part by the liquidation shall be recomputed without regard to the provisions of
section 332 or section 334(b) . . . . Treas. Reg. § 1.332-4(b) (1955).
86. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331(a)(1) and 334(a).
87. See, e.g., Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diamond Situation: Basis to the Purchaser
in Connection with Liquidation, N.Y.U. 13ra INST. ON FED. TAx 623, 634; Merritt, Real
Estate: Methods of Acquisition-Assets or Stock?, N.Y.U. 14rtH INsT. ON FED. TAx 235,
255 (1956); Schwartz, Acquisition of Stock of Another Corporation in Order to Acquire
Assets, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAX INST. 45, 66; 3 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f[ 2434.01.
Mansfield points out that whether the corporation was at fault or not in its failing to
comply with the statutory provisions would be immaterial to the fact of qualification.
88. [T]he Code fails to make clear whether section 334(b)(2) is an exclusive
provision or if the section bars resort to the judicially developed Kimbell-Diamond
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VI. GAIN OR Loss ON RECEIPT OF ASSETS
Whether the purchaser is an individual who satisfied the require-
ments of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, or a corporation which came
under the provisions of section 334(b)(2), the result is the same with
regard to the basis of the acquired assets. This cost-of-stock-basis result
assumes that there will be no gain or loss upon the receipt of the liqui-
dating ditributions. There have been instances, however, addressed spe-
cifically to the resultant gain or loss on receipt of the assets, rather than
to the basis of property question.
Typically, if the purchaser paid an amount in excess of the fair
market value of the assets at the time of the liquidation, he might wish
to settle for a fair market value basis and deduct the difference as a loss
upon liquidation.89 On the other hand, if less than the fair market value
were paid, the Commissioner might seek to tax the difference as a gain.9°
It is fairly well settled, however, that the Kimbell-Diamond concept en-
compasses this type of situation, and if the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine
or the provisions of section 334(b) (2) are found to be applicable, there
will be neither gain nor loss on the liquidation."
rule in cases where the transaction fails to meet the specific time limitations of
the section. . . . Whether the courts, however, will . . . apply the intent test
of Kimbel-Diamond and restrict the basis of the assets to the cost of the stock
even though the specific requirements of section 334(b) (2) are not satisfied
has not yet been answered. CHmILsT'a & SuRREY, WORLD TAX SERIES-TAXATION
IN THE UNITED STATEs 757-58 (1963).
See also Cohen, Gelberg, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 55 CoLtr. L. REv. 37, 43 & 44 (1955):
It is somewhat disquieting to contemplate the coexistence of a precise statutory
rule based on objective criteria and a more nebulous judicial rule based on
subjective intent. Yet such a possibility cannot be ruled out summarily. The
courts may be puzzled by a statute which purports to prescribe a definite rule
without the right of election, yet states the rule in such a way that an election
is actually permitted in not one, but many ways.
The means of election alluded to by the authors include the twelve-month and two-year
rules. It is also noted that there is authority to support the proposition that a tax-
payer may take steps for the specific purpose of avoiding the application of the section.
89. "If property is received in a distribution in partial or complete liquidation
(other than a distribution to which section 333 applies), and if gain or loss is recognized
on receipt of such property, then the basis of the property in the hands of the dis-
tributee shall be the fair market value of such property at the time of the distribution."
INTr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 334(a). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 331(a).
90. Ibid.
91. Gain not recognized: Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938); H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953). Loss not
recognized: Helvering v. Security Say. & Commercial Bank, 72 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1934);
Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950).
The theory of nonrecognition of gain or loss was well expressed by the Cullen court:
The petitioner paid more than the book value or fair market value of the assets
in order to purchase the stock without delay . . . . After acquiring the stock
and dissolving the corporation pursuant to his plan, he had neither more nor
less than he had paid for ..... We do conclude that he had, after the liquida-
tion of the corporation, everything he had paid for when he bought all of
the corporation's stock. He sustained no loss on the transaction." Ruth M. Cullen,
supra at 373-74.
A similar position was taken by Professor Boris I. Bittker when he analogized the above
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Of course, it should be noted that in many instances where a re-
organization is not found and the fair market value of the assets at
distribution prevails, the result will be the same as if the Kimbell-Dia-
mond concepts were applied. This similarity of result occurs when the
fair market value is the same as the cost paid for the stock and is a plaus-
ible situation when there is a prompt liquidation.92
VII. SELLER'S POINT OF VIEW
Up to this point, this article has been concerned primarily with the
application of the step-transaction doctrine in connection with the pur-
chaser. It was noted that the most direct method by which the purchaser
could obtain the desired cost basis for the assets would be through a
direct purchase. The corporate seller, however, would often object to
this procedure because of the double taxation possibility previously con-
sidered." It has been suggested,94 therefore, that the tax effect of the
sale might be overcome if the buyer were willing to pay more for the
assets on a direct sale than he would for the stock, and that an induce-
ment for this action might be to allocate a greater part of the purchase
price to the depreciable assets.95
situation with that involved in the demolition cases, which hold that "a taxpayer who
purchases real estate for the purpose of destroying an existing structure suffers no loss
when he carries out his intention." BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAEHOLOERS 262 (1959).
92. In many cases the courts have recognized the possible applicability of the
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine but found the application unnecessary since the result reached
would not have been changed. See Henning Corp., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mene. 519 (1960);
Southwell Combing Co., 30 T.C. 487 (1958); Austin Transit, Inc., 20 T.C. 849 (1953).
See also Betty C. Stockvis, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68 (1951).
93. See text of section II(A)(1) supra.
94. Friedman & Silbert, Acquisition of Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON
FED. TAX 659, 664-65.
95. Of course, the seller would have to contend with the new provisions of § 1245,
enacted in 1962, which would require that the gain realized on the sale of the depre-
ciable property, to the extent that it does not exceed depreciation deducted since De-
cember 31, 1961, be taxed as ordinary income. This consideration exists as another strong
inducement for the seller to execute the transaction by a sale of stock. On the other
hand, the purchaser will have to anticipate his being subject to the provisions of § 1245
when he liquidates the firm acquired through a stock deal. Section 1245(d) provides that
"this section shall apply notwithstanding any other provisions of this subtitle," and
since a § 334(b)(2) basis is not included in the exceptions, the purchaser will have to
recognize ordinary income to the extent that the difference between the fair market value
of the § 1245 assets and the adjusted basis of the assets in the hands of the liquidating
corporation equals or is less than the post-1961 depreciation deductions. Of course,
it is the liquidating corporation which sustains the tax burden, but in most cases the
purchaser will assume the liability, and consequently, the purchaser's basis in the assets
will be increased to the extent of the obligation assumed. See note 14 supra and ac-
companying text. If the corporation should have sufficient liquid assets to satisfy the
tax obligation (not stripped prior to the sale), and it sets aside the money instead of
including it in the distributions, the purchaser will receive fewer assets than he bar-
gained for and will therefore, once again, be entitled to increase his basis in those
assets he does acquire. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text. The purchaser's
position would seem to be similar whether his basis in the assets was determined under
§ 334(b)(2) (corporation) or under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine (individual). See
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Another manner by which the double tax might be avoided is to
have the corporation distribute the assets in liquidation to the share-
holders who will take them at their fair market value, and then have
the sale of the assets executed by the shareholders individually. Of course,
the pitfall here is the Court Holding Co. doctrine which, if held to be
applicable, would charge the sale of the assets to the corporation not-
withstanding the antecedent distributions in liquidation. 6
A. Natural Corollary of Purchase of Assets-Sale of Assets
With the readily acceptable Kimbell-Diamond doctrine and the pro-
visions of section 334(b) (2) available, it is more than likely that a buyer
will not balk at being required to purchase the stock of the corporate
seller in order to secure its assets. The question still arises, however, as
to whether there being, in substance, a purchase of assets, there was not
also, in substance, a corresponding sale of assets. At this stage of develop-
ment of the Kimbell-Diamond concept the question appears to be aca-
demic. 7 It has been recognized that because only a "unilateral intention"
of the (individual) purchaser to acquire assets is required for the appli-
cation of Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, it is not incongruous to have a pur-
chase of assets on one side of the transaction and a sale of stock on the
other. 8
In the leading case of Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co.,99
the lower court refused to allow a cost-of-stock basis to the purchaser
because the corporation which owned the assets was never a party to
the transaction, and therefore, there could not have been a purchase of
assets without a sale of assets. The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed on
appeal, basing its decision primarily on a purchaser-oriented approach.
The dissent expressed concern over the court's rationale in that it ignored
the existence as a separate entity of the corporation which owned the
assets in determining that though there was a purchase of assets, there
Gallacher, Section 1245-Depreciation Recapture, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX 503
(1964). See also the provisions enacted in 1964 which require ordinary income treatment
on the sale of business realty previously excepted under § 1245. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1250.
96. If it can be shown that negotiations for the sale were entered into by the
corporation prior to the liquidation, a corporate tax might be imposed notwithstanding
the execution of the sale directly by the shareholders subsequent to liquidation. See
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). For a careful analysis of
the application of the Court Holding Co. doctrine and a good review of the cases,
see Steubenville Bridge Co., 11 T.C. 789 (1948). See also Landry, Some Tax Considera-
tions in the Sale or Purchase of a Corporate Business, 9 SYRAcUsE L. REV. 210 (1958).
97. It should be noted, however, that as of the time of this writing, the Internal
Revenue Service has not taken a specific position on whether or not there must be
a corresponding sale of assets whenever the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine or the provisions
of § 334(b)(2) are held to be applicable.
98. Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TH
INST. ON FED. TAx 247, 282 (1954).
99. 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938).
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was not also a corresponding sale of assets. This case was one of the
earlier decisions to recognize what was later to be known as the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine, and it apparently set the scene for the now readily
accepted proposition that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is a purchaser-
oriented remedial device, the application of which should in no way affect
the transaction from the seller's point of view.
This proposition was re-emphasized clearly in a case in which a
purchaser was allowed to carry the assets received in liquidation at the
cost of his stock,'00 notwithstanding that earlier there had been a judicial
determination that the corporation from which he received the property
had not been involved in a sale of assets. 1
One argument made in defense against the quest for "symmetry" is
that the seller might not be able to determine (if it were required to do
so) the purchaser's motive in acquiring its stock."0 2 It was conceded, how-
ever, that certain circumstances might exist which would be consistent
with a sale of assets conclusion. These circumstances are: (1) knowledge
that the purchaser will liquidate immediately after acquisition of the
stock; (2) sale of stock being a last minute idea in negotiations for a
sale of the assets; (3) stripping-down the corporation so that only the
desired asset or assets remain prior to the stock purchase, and (4) sale
of stock during the dissolution of the corporation.' 3
B. Income Earned Prior to Liquidation
Although it is fairly well settled that a "sale of assets" need not
result every time there is a "purchase of assets" under the Kimbell-Dia-
mond concept, if the corporation does not liquidate immediately, any
income earned by it (even if earned directly from the assets which were
100. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 544 (1953).
101. Dallas Downtown Dev. Co., 12 T.C. 114 (1949) (note dissenting opinion).
102. It was noted also that the Internal Revenue Code is replete with instances where
the only concern is the nature of the sale rather than the use to which the subject
matter is to be put-in other words, the seller is not required to be aware of the
purchaser's disposition of the subject matter. See Atlas, Buying Stock to Get Assets or
Caveat Emptor and Venditor, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1029 (1954).
103. Id. at 1043. In S. Nicholas Jacobs, 21 T.C. 165 (1953), aff'd, 224 F.2d 412
(9th Cir. 1955), the specific asset desired by the purchaser was transferred to a dormant
corporation owned by the taxpayer, the stock of which passed as the subject matter of
the sale. The court found, however, that there was in fact a sale of the asset rather than
of stock and the taxpayer was charged with ordinary income. In Virginia W. Stettinius
Dudley, 32 T.C. 564 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1960), not only did
the court find that the transfer of the desired assets to a new corporation formed by the
taxpayer and the subsequent sale of the stock resulted in a sale of the assets, but also,
that dividend income was realized by the taxpayer's shareholders, who held the beneficial
interest in the new company's stock.
It should be noted that the two cases in which a Kimbell-Diamond situation resulted
in a "sale of assets" were those in which the disposition of the stock was preceded by
a transfer of the property involved into a separate corporation. In the absence of this
step, it would appear safe to expect that the seller's side of the transaction will be treated
as a sale of stock.
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the subject matter of the purchase) will be taxed to the corporation rather
than to "the owner of the assets."1 °4 Similarly, during this taxable period
prior to liquidation, the corporation probably will be required to depre-
ciate its own adjusted basis rather than the cost-of-stock basis that the
purchaser will be permitted to utilize upon receipt." 5
At first glance there would appear to be a conceptual conflict be-
tween "disregarding the corporate entity"'0 6 when examining the pur-
chase (and sale) of its assets, and requiring that the corporation bear
the tax burden on income earned by those same assets prior to the liquida-
tion but subsequent to the purchase of the stock. However, it should be
borne in mind that the taxing statutes characteristically are applied in-
dependently to each side of any given transaction-e.g., although a re-
ceipt may be income to one party the disbursement is not necessarily a
deductible expense to the other. In this situation, the purchaser acquires
stock with the concurrent intent of liquidating the firm as soon as possi-
ble, if not immediately. The step-transaction doctrine is applied and the
event is treated as a purchase of assets. The seller, which is the share-
holder of the corporation with the desired assets, is involved only in a
sale of his stock. In the meantime, prior to liquidation, the corporation
does exist as a separate entity and will be treated as such. There is
nothing in the Code which provides for the corporate nonrecognition of
income earned by the firm unless the sales are made pursuant to a plan
of liquidation and certain statutory requirements are satisfied.0 7
104. See H. B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953), in which the tax burden for income
earned subsequent to the purchase of stock (assets) was imposed upon the corporation
under the predecessor of § 482 which allows the Commissioner:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether
or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
. . . [to] distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
In explaining its holding that the corporation should be charged with the income earned
during the interim, the court stated: "The stock purchase coupled with the intent to
dissolve the corporation and the taking of some steps to that end, in our opinion did not
ipso facto either destroy the existence of the corporation as a taxable entity or permit
the petitioner to appropriate as his own income which would otherwise be taxable to
the corporation." H. B. Snively, supra at 858.
105. Since the corporation is required to recognize any income it earns prior to its
liquidation, even if earned directly by the "assets sold," it would naturally follow that
any deductions that accrue prior to liquidation will also be computed without regard
to the sale. Although the point has not been decided specifically, at least two writers
have taken the above position. See Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diamond Situation: Basis to
the Purchaser in Connection with Liquidation, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx 623, 631
(1955) ; Merritt, Real Estate: Methods of Acquisition-Assets or Stock?, N.Y.U. 14TH
INST. ON FED. TAx 235, 254-55 (1956).
106. See the dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., supra
note 99.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337. See discussion in text, section VII(C), infra.
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C. Direct Sales Under Section 337
It was stated that perhaps -the primary reason that a corporation
would decline to sell its assets directly is the possibility that there would
be a double taxation on the transaction-once, to the corporation on the
sale, and again, to the shareholders upon liquidation. Under the 1954
Code, however, a corporation which is to be liquidated-either by its
current shareholders or by the purchaser of the stock---could utilize the
provisions of section 337 and avoid a tax on the corporate level notwith-
standing the direct sale of assets.0 s
Generally, under the terms of section 337, if "a corporation adopts
a plan of liquidation ...and within the 12-month period beginning on
the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation
are distributed in complete liquidation . . then no gain or loss shall be
recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of prop-
erty within such 12-month period."' 9
1. ADVANTAGES TO PURCHASER
Even though in most cases the purchaser would be able to obtain a
cost-of-stock basis without resort to section 337, there are certain ad-
vantages to the purchaser that might accrue by engaging in a direct pur-
chase: (1) only the assets desired need be purchased; (2) a cost basis
is available without the necessity of liquidating the firm; (3) the corpo-
rate structure with its attendant contingent liabilities does not pass; and
(4) a more desirable allocation of cost can be made among the assets
purchased.
2. ADOPTION OF THE PLAN OF LIQUIDATION
Since section 337 provides for the non-recognition of gain or loss
on the sale of assets transacted within the twelve-month period after the
plan of liquidation had been adopted, a corporation may be tempted
to dispose of its "loss assets" prior to the adoption of a plan. However,
the regulations appear to have provided for this situation under the
familiar step-transaction concept. If the sale at a loss prior to the adop-
tion of the plan involves a portion of the firm's assets, but less than
"substantially all of its property,""' the formal adoption date of the
plan of liquidation might not control."'
108. For a concise discussion of §§ 337 and 334(b)(2), see Lewis & Schapiro, Sale
of Corporate Business: Stock or Assets?, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAx 745 (1956).
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (1955).
111. Under the language of the regulations, if "substantially all" of the firm's prop-
erty is sold either before or after the adoption of the plan of liquidation, the date of
the resolution will control and gain or loss will or will not be recognized depending upon
the relative time of sale. However, if a good portion, but not "substantially all," of the
firm's property is sold either before or after the resolution is adopted, the regulations
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If the plan is determined to have been adopted earlier than the date
of the formal resolution, two consequences might result. First, the loss
sustained prior to the formal adoption will not be recognized since it
will be considered to have occurred within the twelve-month period.
Second, and perhaps more significant, is the possibility that the entire
series of sales will fall outside the provisions of section 337. This result
might obtain if the final liquidating distribution of the corporation's
assets is made exactly twelve months after the date on which the plan of
liquidation was formally adopted, in an effort to stay within the pro-
visions.
3. LIMITED RECOGNITION OF GAIN
There is a limitation on the non-recognition of gain provisions in
section 337 that relates to section 334(b)(2).112 This limitation would
apply after the stock of the corporation to be liquidated has been pur-
chased by one who is able to qualify under section 334(b) (2). Con-
sequently, sales made by the corporation within the section 337 period
might result in a taxable gain to the corporation to a limited extent. Any
gain resulting from a sale of property by the corporation, which if dis-
tributed in liquidation would have been taken at a cost-of-stock basis,
shall be recognized to the extent of its appreciation from the date on
which the stock was purchased."8 Appreciation, in this sense, refers to
any difference between the allocable portion of the cost of the stock to
the assets sold and the actual amount realized from the sale of the
assets."4
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whatever direct effect section 334(b) (2) proves to have upon the
economic scene, it would appear that Congress has taken a step in the
right direction by introducing some guidelines upon which a corporate
purchaser of assets-through-stock can rely. Although this area is not par-
ticularly litigious, the total absence as of this writing of any case directly
concerned with the effect or application of the 1954 provisions of section
334(b)(2)"I would seem to indicate that some degree of success has
been attained.
prescribe that "the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be determined
from all the facts and circumstances." Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (1955). For a discussion
of the problems caused by the vague language in § 337 with regard to the date of adoption,
see Friedman & Silbert, Acquisition of Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 659, 669-70 (1957), and Roberts, Statutory Solution to the Court Holding Company
Enigma, 34 TAxEs 431 (1956).
112. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(c)(2). In addition to the gain specifically recog-
nized under § 337(c), the depreciation recapture provisions of §§ 1245 and 1250 may
cause recognition of gain with respect to certain assets. For a detailed discussion of the
effect of the recapture provisions on corporate liquidations, see Gardner, The Impact of
Sections 1245 and 1250 on Corporate Liquidations, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1964).
113. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(c)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.337-4 (1955).
114. See example in Treas. Reg. § 1.337-4(b) (1955).
115. The only pronouncement which deals specifically with the provisions of § 334(b)
(2) is Rev. Rul. 262, 1960-2 Cim. BULL. 114. See note 34 supra.
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The next step would be to utilize further the apparent virtues of
this statutory approach by extending its application to controlling in-
dividuals. Under the present state of the law, one individual who forms
a corporation for the purpose of acquiring the stock of another corpora-
tion can decide almost two years later to liquidate the firm in order to
acquire the assets personally, and still enjoy a cost-of-stock basis. An-
other individual who does not go through the technical steps of forming
a new corporation and who decides, almost two years after personally
purchasing the stock of another corporation, to liquidate, will not enjoy
a cost-of-stock basis. There seems to be no pressing need for such a
strict dichotomy.
A dichotomy which should prevail, however, is that of the tax im-
plications arising from actions taken by a seller and a buyer in any given
transaction. Independent consideration is a necessary concomitant to a
realistic application of the tax laws. The Internal Revenue Service should
define its position in this matter and, preferably, adopt the position of
the courts 16 to the effect that a purchase of assets-through-stock ap-
proach by the buyer is not necessarily a consideration in determining
whether there has been a corresponding sale of assets." 7
Under the principle exemplified by the step-transaction doctrine,
the Kimbell-Diamond rationale still exists as a sound expression of tax
law theory. Therefore, even if provisions are enacted to give a section
334(b)(2) route to a stock purchase by an individual, and presently,
even when a corporation inadvertently or unavoidably fails to comply
with the statutory provisions,' the subjective intent test of the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine should not be absolutely foreclosed to the taxpayer.
For example, if a corporation is unable to purchase eighty per cent of
another firm's stock within a period of twelve months, it should still be
permitted a substance-over-form result if each purchase, made whenever
possible, was with the intent to acquire the other firm's assets.
Because of the statutory periods of time included in the provisions
of sections 334(b)(2) and 337, the step-transaction doctrine becomes
particularly significant in at least two areas. The first deals with the
single transaction conclusion as opposed to a series of purchases of stock
toward the eighty per cent prerequisite. 19 Greater definition is possible
in this area and could be attained by allowing the two-year period to
run from the acquisition of the first eighty per cent, whenever it may
occur, without sacrificing any serious statutory purpose. The second,
however, must perhaps exist in a state of flexibility. This problem in-
volves the date on which the plan of liquidation had been adopted. 20
116. See notes 99-101 supra.
117. See discussion in text, section VII(A) supra.
118. See discussion in text, section V(E)(2) supra.
119. See discussion in text, section V(B) supra.
120. See discussion in text, section VII(C)(2) supra.
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The flexibility afforded by the "substantially all of its property" and
"from all the facts and circumstances" language, 2' is necessary to dis-
courage abuse in the disposition of loss assets prior to the formal adop-
tion of the resolution to liquidate.
The concepts of the step-transaction doctrine have served well to
afford a realistic approach to the solution of tax problems in the past and
will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in the many ap-
propriate areas of application within the Internal Revenue Code.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (1955). See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
